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Ronald Reagan's landslide presidential election victory in 1984
shows how short term forces1 can influence vote choice. Election deci-
sions are also influenced by other traditional forces such as party identifi-
cation.2 However, when party identification does not determine vote
choice, as in nonpartisan or in primary elections, the appearance of the
election ballot can play a role in the vote choice.3 Political scientists the-
orize that a candidate who is listed first on the ballot will receive an
electoral advantage simply by being listed first.' As a result, a top-listed
candidate, who is not favored among those voters with a preference, can
actually win an election due to the votes of uninformed voters favoring
the first position.
Statutes which confer a position benefit on certain candidates5 in
1. Short term forces are issues which are unique to a particular election and therefore, affect
voters in some way only in that election. In Reagan's case, his popularity among the electorate was a
major factor in his victory. See H. ASHER, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND AMERICAN POLITICS 31
(3d ed. 1984).
2. Id. Vote choice is a function of several factors, some of which affect the magnitude of
position bias. For instance, a voter's party identification is a major, if not the primary, component of
vote choice. Id. at 31-32. Thus, in a general election, a voter is more inclined to vote for the candi-
date of his or her own party. Even if a voter goes to the polls in a particular election with no
preference among the candidates, he or she can cast a vote based on party identification with reason-
able certainty that the vote somehow reflects his or her desires. However, when cues provided by
party identification are missing, as in a party primary or a nonpartisan contest, the uninformed voter
has no way of casting a vote which reflects his or her views. No traditional cues help the voter to
make a decision.
3. See H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, BALLOT PoSrrION AND VOTER'S CHOICE 4 (1957). A candi-
date's position on the ballot is a voting cue in primary and nonpartisan elections. However, unlike
party identification, which provides a somewhat meaningful guide to voting, position bias is a com-
pletely capricious factor in elections. Bias is unrelated in any way to the voters' preferences between
Republican and Democrat, incumbent or challenger.
4. See Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, -, 333 P.2d 293, 295 (1958) (stating that "it is
a commonly known and accepted fact" that being listed first confers an advantage on the candidate
so listed); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 668, 536 P.2d 1337, 1341, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 381 (1975)
(finding that ballot position preference is a factor in municipal elections); see also Note, Position of
Candidates' Names and Special Designations on Ballots: Equal Protection Problems with the Massa-
chusetts Election Law, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 694 (1975) (arguing that a state law giving position
preference to certain candidates is unconstitutional). "Position bias" is the phrase often used to
describe the advantage a top-listed candidate receives from being listed first.
5. For an example of beneficial statutes, see ALA. CODE § 17-8-4 (1975) (reserving left-hand
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primary and nonpartisan general elections may be subject to constitu-
tional attack because of the burden that position bias places on individual
rights protected by the Equal Protection Clause.6 These statutes impair
the right to candidacy by handicapping lower-listed candidates, infringe
the right to vote by requiring a larger number of voters with a preference
to support a lower-listed candidate, and burden the freedom of associa-
tion of voters who support lower-listed candidates by making it less likely
that their candidate will prevail. Courts are currently split on the appro-
priate standard of review to apply in ballot position cases.7 The present
conflict among the courts in determining the applicable standard of re-
view under the Equal Protection Clause should be resolved by first recog-
column for party which comes first alphabetically - always the Democrats among the major par-
ties); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 4502 (1974) (left-hand column reserved for Democrats); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 46, para. 7-19 (Smith-Hurd 1965 & Supp. 1987) (names in primaries arranged in order in
which candidates filed for office); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701 (1964) (names listed alphabet-
ically in primaries); OiLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 6-106 (1981) (reserving left-hand column of ballot for
Democrats).
6. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F,2d 460
(7th Cir. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S. 939 (1978); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
7. See infra notes 94-151 and accompanying text.
Analysis under the Equal Protection Clause generally falls into three categories. These strands
of analysis differ from each other in that the Court gives more deference to legislative judgments
which fall into the minimum rationality mode rather than the middle tier or strict scrutiny strands,
The reasoning behind using different standards of review in equal protection cases is found in the
often-quoted footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) where
Justice Stone stated:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to
be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation,
is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation.
Id. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted).
Based on Justice Stone's note, the Court has applied strict scrutiny whenever fundamental
rights guaranteed by the first ten amendments are affected by state action or when legislation distin-
guishes between people on a "suspect" basis. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 531 (3d ed. 1986). When applying strict scrutiny, the Court requires that the state
choose means which are necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. Id.
Middle-tier analysis is invoked when the state's legislation is drawn on lines based on gender or
legitimacy. This standard requires that the legislation be substantially related to an important state
interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Middle-tier analysis gives more deference to
legislatures because it does not require the state to choose means which are necessary to achieve
some goal, and the test does not require that the goal be compelling. Id.
The strand of analysis which affords the most deference to a legislature is the minimum ration-
ality test. This level of review is normally applied to economic legislation and requires only that
there be some rational relation between the asserted state interest and the means chosen to achieve it.
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 530. Legislation which falls into this category is
presumed constitutional. Id.
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nizing that position bias burdens fundamental rights protected by the
Constitution. Therefore, a strict standard of review should be applied
when examining statutes regulating ballot position.
Although the issue of position bias raises constitutional questions,
little legal material addresses this problem.8 Some courts have dealt with
the issue, but for the most part, studies of position bias have been largely
confined to political science journals.9 Nevertheless, the effects of posi-
tion bias cannot be underestimated. When one considers news accounts
of races being recounted or won by the narrowest of margins,"0 the im-
portance of possible position bias is vividly highlighted. In a country
where only a few votes can decide winners, losers, and policy directions
of the government, position bias should be eliminated.
II. POSITION BIAS
The methods of favoring one candidate over another in terms of bal-
lot placement are as numerous as the states. The Australian Ballot11
used in the United States has contributed to this problem by allowing
states to choose different ballot formats, each of which favors a predeter-
mined class of candidate. For example, some states' formats for general
elections require that ballots be printed in party columns, 2 where each
party occupies a column on the ballot with candidates from each party
listed vertically in the party column. Most instances of favorable treat-
ment, however, are found in nonpartisan and primary elections. Statutes
8. For some of the only scholarly works on this issue, see Comment, Elections - Right of
Suffrage and Regulation Thereof - Official Ballots: Validity of Ballot Access and Ballot Position
Restrictions, 57 N.D.L. Rav. 495 (1981); Comment, Equal Protection in Ballot Positioning, 28 U.
FLA. L. REv. 816 (1976); Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An Unconstitutional Advantage
to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1972); Note, supra note 4. For other works, see infra note
9.
9. The most recent work dealing with position bias is Darcy, Position Effects With Party Col-
umn Ballots. 39 W. POL. Sc. Q. 648 (1986). Other works include: Masterman, The Effect of the
"Donkey Vote" on the House of Representatives, 10 AUSTL. J. POL. & HIST. 221 (1964); white,
Voters Plump for First on List, 39 NAT. Civic Rnv. 110 (1950).
10. Some election results from Oklahoma within the past twenty years put this in some perspec-
tive. In 1970, the governor's race was won by a margin of 2,181 votes out of 698,790 cast (.3% of
the vote); in 1982, the District 16 race for state senator was won by only .4% of the vote; and the
1984 Tulsa mayoral race was won by only 1% of the vote.
11. The Australian Ballot is a ballot which lists all the candidates who are running for office on
a single ballot, rather than separate ballots for each candidate. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian
Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876-1908, 64 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1220, 1221 (1970).
12. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 § 6-106 (1981) (reserving left-hand column for Democrats); ALA.
CODE § 17-8-4 (1975) (reserving left-hand column for party which comes first alphabetically). The
theory of position bias predicts that the party listed first will fare better than all other parties.
1987]
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commonly arrange names in alphabetical order,13 in filing order, 4 by
random drawing,"5 or with the incumbent listed first.1 6 Each of these
placement methods favors certain classes of candidates at the expense of
others.
A. Detecting Position Bias
Although position bias may seem logical, 17 detecting it is difficult.
Political scientists who have studied the effects of position bias generally
examine election contests which use a rotated ballot. I I Analyses of elec-
tions which use a rotated ballot compare the actual vote totals in each of
the differing positions with the vote total that each position would be
expected to receive. These analyses show not only whether position bias
is present in any election, but also determines how much of an advantage
or disadvantage each position received as a result of the bias. 19
Several studies have found evidence of position bias in elections.
Each study concentrates on a particular type of election. The analyses
fall into three categories: whether the election is a high or low visibility
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 3124(b) (1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701(2)(B)
(1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-7-5 (1984 & Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2472 (1982).
14. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, § 7-19(2) (Smith-Hurd 1965 & Supp. 1987). Alphabetic voting is
discussed in Masterman, supra note 9, where the author notes that an unexpectedly large number of
representatives in the Australian House have surnames which begin at the front of the alphabet.
15. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 3-114(b) (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-12 (West 1964 & Supp.
1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2875 (Purdon 1963 & Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.60(1)(b),
5(a), 6, 8 (West 1986 & Supp. 1986).
16. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 34 (West 1975 & Supp. 1987).
17. Conventional political science theories of voting also explain position bias. Riker and
Ordeshook theorize that a person's decision of whether or not to vote is largely the result of a
person's somehow weighing the advantages and disadvantages of doing so. Riker & Ordeshook, A
Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 25, 25-40 (1968). Thus, voters who are only
marginally inclined to vote would likely put little effort into making intelligent decisions regarding
races he or she knows little about. As a result, such a voter would vote for the top listed candidate
- the first candidate he or she sees on the ballot.
President Woodrow Wilson has this to say about how a lengthy ballot can tax a voter:
I have seen a ballot.., which contained seven hundred names. It was bigger than the
page of a newspaper and was printed in close columns as a newspaper would be. Of course
no voter who is not a trained politician, who has not watched the whole process of nomina-
tion carefully, who does not know a great deal about the derivation and character and
association of every nominee it contains, can vote a ticket like that with intelligence. In
nine cases out often, as it has turned out, he will simply mark the first name under each
office, and the candidates whose names come highest in alphabetical order will be elected.
H. BAIN AND D. HECOCK, supra note 3, at 99.
18. Several states have provisions for ballot rotation in primary elections, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit.
26 § 6-109 (1981); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 16-464(A), 465(A), 466(E) (1984 & Supp. 1986); CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 10216 (West 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-212 (1986).
19. See Appendix I for a description of the method.
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss1/5
BALLOT POSITION
contest, whether the election is conducted with voting machines or paper
ballots, and whether the election is partisan or nonpartisan.
Examples of position bias affecting low visibility races are found in a
published analysis of the California election returns from 1968 and 1970
elections.2" In elections for judges of the Superior Court, the candidate
in the first position received anywhere from 12% to 61% more votes
than expected.2" The same analysis, applied to the 1970 Democratic gu-
bernatorial primary, showed that the candidate in the first position actu-
ally received fewer votes than expected. 22 These results illustrate the
different impacts that position bias has on low and high visibility races.
Position bias has a greater effect in low visibility races because less voters
have a real preference as to who wins the election. Consequently, posi-
tion bias effectively distributes a higher percentage of the disinterested
vote to the first position as shown by the analysis of the California
elections.
Many instances of position bias have been detected when voting ma-
chines were used in an election.23 In fact, some studies have shown a
greater bias effect when voting machines were used than when paper bal-
lots were used because the voting machine is more complicated for the
voter to operate. 24 In one Ohio primary election in which voting ma-
chines were used, the first position gathered 60% of all votes cast, even
though the position of the candidates on the ballots were rotated by
precinct.25
Finally, position bias is more pronounced in nonpartisan general
elections and partisan primaries than in partisan general elections. When
candidates listed on the ballot are not visibly associated with a political
party, an important control of voting behavior is absent.26 Thus, votes
are cast which do not reflect true preferences and are distributed un-
evenly to favor the first listed candidate.27
20. These studies are found in Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An Unconstitutional
Advantage to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1972).
21. Id. at 375.
22. Id.
23. White, supra note 9. Statistics quoted are from the White article.
24. H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, supra note 3, at 45.
25. White, supra note 9.
26. H. Asher, supra note 1, at 31-33.
27. Mueller, Choosing Among 133 Candidates, 34 PuB. OPINION Q. 395 (1970). Mueller
pointed out that one nonpartisan school board election demonstrated a strong link between a candi-
date's top placement and the amount of votes received. He also found that it is possible that statutes
which regulate ballot position by listing candidates alphabetically influence who decides to run for
elections. He noted that of the election he studied, 11% of the 133 candidates' surnames began with
1987]
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Not all studies claim to have found evidence of position bias. In
fact, the most recent scholarly work on bias, conducted by Robert Darcy,
concluded that bias was not a factor in general elections.28 However,
critical analysis of Darcy's work reveals that the results of his study actu-
ally supports the theory of position bias. Darcy examined the vote re-
turns of twenty-two 1984 elections. After calculating the percentage of
the vote each position received, Darcy concluded that position bias was
not a statistically significant factor in the outcome of any of the elec-
tions.2 9 Although there may have been no statistical significance in his
findings, Darcy fails to recognize that all but one of the elections studied
did show evidence of position bias. In twenty-one of the returns, the
percentage of the vote each candidate received while occupying the first
or second position varied as the position of their names were rotated. 0
Although this variation was not statistically significant, it still affected
the election returns. Darcy's failure to distinguish between statistical
tests of significance and actualpresence of position bias is the fatal flaw in
his work. Instead of disproving the theory of position bias, Darcy's
study actually supports its existence.
B. Judicial Recognition of Position Bias
In addition to certain political science studies, various courts have
recognized the effects of position bias.3' In particular, Illinois courts
have become very receptive to the constitutional issues raised by statutes
which regulate ballot position.32 Nevertheless, courts disagree on what
type of impact bias can have on an election. For example, in Ulland v.
Growe,3 the Minnesota Supreme Court reluctantly recognized that, in a
few elections, some advantage accrues to the top listed candidate. How-
ever, the court listed several reasons why it was not persuaded that posi-
tion bias had a meaningful effect in some elections. First, no method
the letter A, while only 5% of Los Angeles residents, where the eligible candidates were drawn, had
similar surnames. Id. at 397.
28. Darcy, supra note 9.
29. Id. at 661. Appendix II summarizes and correctly explains Darcy's study.
30. Appendix II.
31. McLain v. Meier, 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412
(Minn.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P,2d 1337,
122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958).
32. See, e-g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977), appeal dismissed, 435 U.S.
939 (1978); Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971); Shakman v. Demo-
cratic Org. of Cook County, 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
33. 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
[Vol. 23:123
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existed to correctly measure the "extent" of position bias in an election.34
Second, the court observed that neither party disputed the finding that
position bias is more pronounced in nonpartisan elections than in parti-
san elections.35 Because the election at issue in Ulland was partisan, the
court rejected any argument that position bias played a meaningful role
in its outcome. Had the election been nonpartisan, the court may have
been more willing to recognize position bias as a factor. Nevertheless,
the Ulland court did recognize that position bias may exist in varying
31degrees in some elections. 6
Other courts have not been as reluctant as the Ulland court to rec-
ognize position bias in partisan elections. At one extreme, the court in
Kautenburger v. Jackson37 stated that "[ilt is a commonly known and
accepted fact that.., where a number of candidates or nominees for the
same office are before the electorate, those whose names appear at the
head of the list have a distinct advantage."38Kautenburger involved a
partisan primary result which was contested by a losing candidate. In
McLain v. Meier,39 the court recognized position bias in partisan elec-
tions even though the evidence presented at trial was not perfectly appli-
cable to the case being decided.' Although some courts have
unequivocally recognized position bias, particularly in nonpartisan elec-
tions,4 ' others have not. In Schell v. Studebaker42 a defeated candidate
filed suit to void an election in which the ballots had not been rotated as
required by the state constitution. The court found no evidence that the
election results would have been different had a rotation system been
used. Thus, the court found that there was not a showing that position
bias was a determinative factor in the election.43
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Position bias dilutes the votes of informed voters who support an
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id. However, in McLain, 637 F.2d at 1166, the court suggested that there is not an appreci-
able difference between partisan and nonpartisan elections.
36. Ulland, 262 N.W.2d at 415-16.
37. 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958).
38. Id. at -, 333 P.2d at 295 (quoting Elliot v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245,-.., 294 N.W.
171, 193 (1940) (per curiam).
39. 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 1166.
41. See Darcy, supra note 9, at 650 (the author concludes there is no position bias in general
elections).
42. 174 N.E.2d 637 (Ohio C.P. 1960), appeal dismissed, 173 N.E.2d 107 (1961).
43. Id. at 640. The court did not hold that position bias does not exist, only that there was no
showing that it would have a meaningful effect in the election.
19871
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unfavorably placed candidate. This dilution occurs as a result of a higher
percentage of any uninformed or disinterested vote being cast for the
candidate listed first. Dilution of votes infringes upon a citizen's right to
be a candidate, burdens the fundamental right to vote, and impairs the
voters' first amendment freedom of association. Analysis of these rights
illustrates a relationship among them.'
A. The Right to Be a Candidate
While it may be true that a right to be a candidate exists, clearly the
right is not a fundamental right. No express language in the Constitution
confers a right to candidacy; hence, the Supreme Court has stated that
any restrictions which a state may place on a citizen's ability to run for
office must be consistent with the demands of the Equal Protection
Clause.45
1. Whose Rights are Affected?
The close relationship between the right to vote and the right to be a
candidate necessarily means that burdening one right has some effect on
the other. By limiting the possible number of candidates, a state both
prevents a citizen from voting for a potentially effective leader, and de-
nies that citizen an opportunity to run for office.
Courts which have identified the link between the right to vote and
the right to candidacy, do so by recognizing "that voters' rights are
abridged by the impairment of a candidate's ability to gain access to the
44. See, ag., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974) (denying indigent a ballot position infringes
interests of potential candidate (his rights of expression and association) as well as interest of the
voters who may vote); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) ("the rights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always
have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."); Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook
County, 435 F.2d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 1970) (interests of candidate to be free from intentional discrim-
ination and voters' interests in an effective vote are constitutionally protected), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
909 (1971).
45. Bullock 405 U.S. at 143. In Bullock, the Court stated that any system which creates barn-
ers to the ballot is not automatically subjected to the type of strict scrutiny normally reserved for
instances when suspect classes or fundametal rights are affected by state action. Thus, ballot access
statutes have to be rationally related to legitimate state interests unless they also burden other funda-
mental rights or discriminate against suspect classes. Id. See also Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412,
415 (Minn.) (en banc) (electoral regulations receive a "rational basis" scrutiny), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 927 (1978); Blassman v. Markworth, 359 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. I11. 1973) (holding a ten year resi-
dency requirement before running for office did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). Contra
Mancuso v. Taft, 476 F.2d 187, 195 (1st Cir. 1973) (any law which infringes the interests of an
individual in running for office must be given strict review).
[Vol. 23:123
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ballot."46 In Mancuso v. Taft,47 the court found a strong relationship
between the two rights. A Rhode Island statute prohibited any candidate
from keeping his or her job as a civil servant.4 8 The court prefaced its
analysis of the case by noting that "whenever a state or city regulates the
right to become a candidate for public office, it also regulates the citizen's
right to vote; the person or persons whose candidacy is affected may be
the voters' choice for public official."'49 Thus, the court found that the
statute was subject to strict scrutiny because of its infringement on the
fundamental right to vote, and that the statute was unconstitutional be-
cause it contravened the Equal Protection Clause.
The link between voters' rights and candidates' rights was strength-
ened in Antonio v. Kirkpatrick,50 a case which held that a ten year resi-
dency requirement for potential candidates was unconstitutional. The
court found that the residency requirement burdened no less than three
rights guaranteed by the Constitution: the right to associate, the right to
be a candidate, and the right to travel.5 ' Furthermore, although the
right to run for office may not be as valued as the right to vote, a statute
burdening the right to run for office which also has a substantial impact
on voting rights will be subjected to strict scrutiny.52 Thus, the court in
Antonio both identified the link between the two rights as well as limited
the effect of the connection. Only if the candidacy restriction has a sub-
stantial impact on voting rights will strict scrutiny be invoked. Other-
wise, the state is free to use any reasonable means to achieve its
legitimate objectives. However, Antonio involved a state law which de-
nied voters the opportunity to support a person who was as qualified as
any other candidate, except for the residency requirement. The court
found that this restriction on voting rights was both substantial and too
broad to be constitutionally permissible; therefore, the statute was struck
down. 3
46. Gordon, The Constitutional Right to Candidacy, 25 U. KAN. L. REv. 545, 558 (1977).
47. 476 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1973).
48. Id. at 189. A similar law was upheld by the Supreme Court in Clements v. Fashing, 457
U.S. 957 (1982) (plurality opinion). In Clements, the plurality asserted there was no fundamental
right of candidacy. Id. at 963. The dissent would have applied a strict review due to the infringe-
ment of the First Amendment Rights. Id. at 976-90.
49. Mancuso, 476 F.2d at 193.
50. 453 F. Supp. 1161 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd., 579 F.2d 1147 (1978).
51. "Indisputably, the State of Missouri has intruded into a constitutionally sensitive area,
laced with the penumbrae of protected associational conduct such as travel, voting, and the heart of
government, candidacy." Id. at 1165.
52. Id. at 1164.
53. For other cases applying a strict scrutiny standard, see Wellford v. Battaglia, 485 F.2d 1151
(3d Cir. 1973); Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972); Fleak v. Allman, 420 F. Supp. 822
1987]
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2. State Restrictions On Candidacy
State restrictions on candidacy have traditionally taken many forms.
In Bullock v. Carter,54 the Court examined a Texas Election Code provi-
sion which imposed a candidate filing fee as a prerequisite for candidacy.
The amount of the fee was dependent upon such factors as the race to be
contested and the size of the population in the county or counties in
which the contest was to take place. The statutory system imposed fees
ranging from $1000 to $8900 per candidate.5 5 The state maintained that
the purpose of the fee was to require the candidates to generate funds for
the election. However, the Court found that the state's interest was not
rationally related to a fee system and thus held that the statute was un-
constitutional. Requiring the payment of a fee before allowing a candi-
date to appear on a ballot did not further a legitimate state goal.5 6
Another type of restriction on candidacy is a residency requirement.
Generally, this restriction requires a person to live in the state or county
for a certain period of time to be eligible for candidacy. The constitu-
tionality of this restriction was most recently tested in Hankins v. State
of Hawaii.57 Article V, section 1 of the Hawaiian Constitution requires
that a person be a resident of Hawaii for five years before becoming eligi-
ble to run for governor.58 A gubernatorial candidate who had only re-
sided in the state three years prior to the election wanted his name
included on the list of candidates seeking nomination in the party pri-
mary. When he was not allowed to do so because of the statutory re-
quirement, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the court.
After noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitu-
tionality of residency requirements, and that most courts analyze such
statutes under a strict scrutiny standard, the Federal District Court of
Hawaii opted instead to apply a minimum rationality test, but found that
the statute would also meet a strict scrutiny test if applied. 9 The court
(W.D. Okla. 1976); Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D. N.H. 1974), aff'd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975);
Alexander v. Kammer, 363 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. Mich. 1973); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211
(D. N.H.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); Headlee v. Franklin County Board of Elections, 368 F. Supp,
999 (S.D. Ohio 1973); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972); Draper v,
Phelps, 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich,
1971); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd, 401 U.S. 968 (1971); Stapleton v.
Clerk of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
54. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
55. Id. at 138 & n.11.
56. Id. at 147.
57. 639 F. Supp. 1552 (D. Haw. 1986).
58. Id. at 1553.
59. Id. at 1554-56.
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reasoned that the right to hold office has not yet been accorded the status
of a fundamental right. Also, the court observed that a durational resi-
dency requirement does not penalize the exercise of other constitutional
rights when the requirement is imposed on candidates.6 ° In fact, the
court found approval for its decision to apply minimum rationality in
recent Supreme Court dictum.61 The court, therefore, upheld the dura-
tional requirement of the state constitution.
Although restrictions based on property ownership of a potential
candidate are few,62 requirements that a candidate demonstrate a certain
level of voter support are not. However, if the requirement onerously
burdens a potential candidate's ability to appear on a ballot, it is subject
to strict scrutiny because of the effect that the statute has on voters'
rights. For example, in Williams v. Rhodes,63 the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional an Ohio statute requiring a new political party to
demonstrate support from 15% of the total number of ballots cast in the
previous gubernatorial race before being allowed on a ballot. Under this
Ohio scheme, Republicans and Democrats could retain positions merely
by polling 10% of the vote in the previous election. By treating the two
classes of parties differently, the state heavily burdened the voters' right
to associate with a new political party, as well as impinged upon the
voters' right to cast their vote effectively." 4 The statute abridged the
right to associate because voters who supported a party that was unable
to secure a ballot position were denied the opportunity to vote their true
preferences. Similarly, their votes could not be cast effectively because
the electors' first choice was not on the ballot. The state's justifications
for the law were its interests in promoting political stability through a
60. Id. at 1555. In the context of residency requirements for voters, see Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) and Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
61. Hankins, 639 F. Supp. at 1555. The court quoted Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982)
(plurality opinion). In Clements the court identified two strands of ballot-access cases: those involv-
ing classifications based on wealth, and those cases which burden "small political parties or in-
dependent candidates." Id. at 964. Finding that a waiting period is not a significant barrier to such
candidates, the Court held that "this sort of insignificant interference with access to the ballot need
only rest on a rational predicate in order to survive a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause."
Id. at 968. waiting periods of up to seven years have been upheld. See Chimento v. Stark, 353 F.
Supp. 1211 (D. N.H.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 802 (1973).
62. The only Supreme Court case to deal with such a requirement is Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346 (1970), where the Court declared unconstitutional a state law requiring school board mem-
bers to own real property. Such a requirement amounted to discrimination. Id. at 364. In Chap-
pelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977), the court summarily reversed a
lower court decision upholding a property ownership requirement. See generally J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 7, at 780-81.
63. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
64. Id. at 30.
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two-party system, insuring that a winner had the support of a majority of
the voters, and preventing unduly long and complicated ballots.6
Although the court recognized some merit in the latter two arguments, it
flatly rejected the first argument because of the monopoly that would
result if a state were permitted to favor existing parties over new
parties.66
B. The Right To Vote
1. The Nature of the Right
Although there is no constitutional right to vote per se,67the
Supreme Court has recognized that statutes which directly burden this
right are subject to strict scrutiny. Therefore, requirements which re-
strict the right to vote must further a compelling state interest. With few
exceptions,68 the Court has struck down laws which burden the right to
vote. Thus, in Kramer v. Union Free School District,69 the Court invali-
dated a New York law70 which prohibited registered voters from partici-
pating in a school district election unless the voter was a parent, had
custody of a child enrolled in school, or owned or leased property in the
school district.71 New York argued that these requirements were in-
tended to limit the electorate to those with an appreciable interest in the
election outcome. However, in a rigorous application of the strict scru-
65. Id. at 31-33.
66. Id. at 32.
67. "There is no constitutional right to vote, as such." Shakman v. Democratic Org. of Cook
County, 481 F. Supp. 1315, 1334 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Yet the Supreme Court has found that the cumu-
lative effect of amendments has fashioned a fundamental right to vote. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 7, at 720.
68. E.g., Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904) (allowing a state to require a person be a bona
fide resident before voting).
69. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
70. The Court quoted section 2012 of the New York Educational Law which read:
A person shall be entitled to vote at any school meeting for the election of school
district officers.., who is:
1. A citizen of the United States
2. Twenty-one years of age.
3. A resident within the district for a period of thirty days next preceding the meeting
at which he offers to vote; and who in addition thereto possesses one of the following three
qualifications:
a. Owns or is the spouse of an owner, leases, hires, or is in the possession under a
contract of purchase [real property] ... or
b. Is the parent of a child of school age, provided such a child shall have attended the
district school ... or
c. Not being a parent, has permanently residing with him a child of school age who
shall have attended the district school ....
Id. at 633-34.
71. Id. at 622.
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tiny test, the Court found that the means New York had chosen were not
necessary to serve its interests. For example, the statute was underinclu-
sive in that it assumed that voters without children or property did not
have the same interest in schools as voters with children or property.
The statute also granted the franchise to people who may not have had
any interest in public education.72 The Court, therefore, invalidated the
law because it was both under- and overinclusive.73
The right to vote was broadened dramatically in the 1960's.
Supreme Court cases established that the right to vote in state elections is
implicitly guaranteed by the federal Constitution,74 that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause requires that one person's vote be substantially equal to
another's, 75 and that a dilution of votes is tantamount to a denial of the
vote.76
2. The Right to Vote Equals the Right to Vote Effectively
As a result of the right to vote emphasis of the 1960's, and particu-
larly because of the Reynolds v. Sims 7 7 and Wesberry v. Sanders78 deci-
sions, the right to vote was equated with the right to vote effectively.
This equation is a logical extension of the "one man, one vote" require-
ment of Reynolds and Westberry. If inequitable apportionment is depriv-
ing district voters of equal representation, and therefore an effective vote
in the legislature, then the Equal Protection Clause provides a remedy.
Nevertheless, courts which have addressed the issue of whether the
right to vote means the right to vote effectively have made interesting
observations of how that maxim conflicts with real voting behavior. For
72. Id. at 632.
73. Id. at 633.
74. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Harper represents a chal-
lenge to a poll tax which had been imposed as a condition to vote. The Court held that the Virginia
law imposed a condition on voting which was totally unrelated to the state's interest in fixing
qualifications.
75. An often quoted passage from Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) explains why:
Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities or economic interests. As long as ours is a representative form of govern-
ment, and our legislatures are those instruments of government elected directly by and
directly representative of the people, the right to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired
fashion is a bedrock of our political system.
Id. at 562.
76. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). This case held that article 1, § 2 of the federal
Constitution requires that "as nearly as practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another's." Id. at 7-8. The Court based its holding on the theory that of the two
houses, one would represent the people, and the other the states. Id. at 13.
77. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
78. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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example, in Ulland v. Growe,19 the court stated:
We know of no authority which would allow us to treat the votes of
any voters, however ill-informed, as if they were somehow inferior,
thereby "diluting" the effect of the more thoughtfully cast ballots. In
short, the fact that some citizens may choose to vote irrationally, as is
their right, does not mean that the votes of better-informed voters are
arithmetically "diluted" within the language of the reapportionment
decisions.80
Thus, the court seems to be admitting that the right to cast an effective
vote can be infringed so long as the infringement is the result of unin-
formed votes being cast. Further, courts will continue to tacitly admit
that there is no constitutional right to an election free of position bias
until they recognize that bias does have an effect in nearly all elections.81
C. The Right of Association
The freedom of association is implicated in ballot position cases for
one reason. Position bias in effect penalizes those voters who support an
unfavorably positioned candidate. Their right to associate with that can-
didate is infringed by the state consciously favoring a higher positioned
candidate. Although the right to associate is an issue in position bias, its
boundaries are defined by looking to its application in other cases.
1. What is the Right to Associate?
The Supreme Court recognizes the right of association as a funda-
mental right protected by the Constitution.8 2 Thus, state action which
burdens the ability to associate is subjected to strict scrutiny. While this
heightened scrutiny may be "strict in theory, fatal in fact," there are still
instances where compelling state interests have overcome the presump-
79. 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
80. Id. at 416 (emphasis added). The court distinguished the effect of an irrationally cast vote
from the effect of an inequitably apportioned vote because the latter involves a practice which creates
an "immutable or absolute advantage or preclusion," while an irrationally cast vote does not. Id. at
416 n.12.
81. See Note, Minnesota Ballot Position Statute Does Not Violate Equal Protection, 5 wM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 259, 268 (1979).
82. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), the Supreme Court laid down what was to
become the standard definition of the right to associate.
Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association .... It is beyond debate that freedom to
engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the "liberty" assured by the Due Process Clause ....
Id. at 460. The Court required that a state's demand for the NAACP to reveal its membership list
withstand the "closest scrutiny." Id. at 461. The state order would have had the effect of discourag-
ing membership in the NAACP, so the state could not compel disclosure. Id. at 462-63.
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tion of unconstitutionality which is raised when fundamental rights are
adversely affected by state action. One area upon which the right to asso-
ciate has been infringed is in limiting the political activity of government
employees. Certain types of political expression may validly be re-
strained by the state. In this context, the government asserts that regula-
tion is necessary because government employment could be abused if it
were allowed to be a means of achieving some politcal advantage.8 3 Fur-
thermore, the government also has an interest in limiting the political
activity of employees because of the possibility that party loyalty may
impair a worker's productivity.8 4 If these, or similar state interests are
not served by narrowly drawn restrictions on association, the private in-
terest will prevail over the state's interest.
2. Modem Analysis of the Right of Association
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,5 the Court enunciated the mod-
em bounds of the right of association. The Jaycees' bylaws allowed only
men to be regular voting members of that private association. Women
could be members, but only in a limited, nonvoting capacty. 86 As a re-
sult, when one chapter began admitting women as regular members, the
national office threatened to revoke its charter, and the chapter filed suit
under a Minnesota anti-discrimination law. 7
The Roberts Court identified two strands which compose the right
of association. One extends to private types of relationships which are
fundamental to society. This strand of association is a fundamental ele-
ment of the liberty protected by the Constitution. s8 However, the second
type of association is not always entitled to the same level of scrutiny.
This second strand includes the "right to associate for the purpose of
83. In United States Civil Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413
U.S. 548 (1973), the Court upheld a federal statute which limited political involvement of federal
employees. The Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C § 7324 (1981) reads in part:
(a) An employee in an Executive agency or an individual employed by the government of
the District of Columbia may not -
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of interfering with or affect-
ing the result of an elction; or
(2) take an active part in political management or in political campaigns.
84. United States Civil Service Comm'n., 413 U.S. at 564-66.
85. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
86. Id. at 613.
87. "It is an unfair discriminatory practice: To deny any person the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of a place of public
accommodation because of race, color, creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex. " MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 63.03(3) (West 1982) (repealed 1983).
88. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18.
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engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment-speech,
assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of reli-
gion."89 Between the two types of freedom lies a spectrum in which
every case must fall.90 As the personal attachment to the association in
question increases, the case is given a higher standard of review. The
Court in Roberts determined that any challenge to the right of associa-
tion should focus on the context in which the challenge takes place. The
level of scrutiny is determined by the extent to which the right sought to
be protected resembles one or the other strand of freedom of association.
Roberts, however, involved a case where the interests of the Jaycees
in excluding women was not constitutionally protected.9 Further, the
regular members' right of association was subordinate to the compelling
state interest of eliminating discrimination against women.92 The Court,
therefore, recognized that the right to associate for the purpose of expres-
sing views is a fundamental right which can be abridged only if the state
is addressing a compelling state interest. In Roberts, the state had
demonstrated a compelling interest and therefore, could require the
Jaycees to admit women.93
IV. CHALLENGES TO BALLOT POSITION STATUTES: THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD
When the preceding rights are infringed, deciding which standard of
review94 to apply may be relatively simple. However, as cases which
have dealt with position bias show, the same determination is more diffi-
cult to make when reviewing statutes regulating ballot position. Case
law runs the gamut, from those courts which apply a strict level of re-
view,95 to some requiring only minimum rationality,96 and still others
that seem to apply their own test.97
89. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
90. Id. at 620. The Court identified some of the factors which are examined in this inquiry; the
size, purpose, policies, selectivity, and congeniality of the association are a few of them. Id.
91. Id. at 621.
92. Id. at 623.
93. Id.
94. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the levels of review under the Equal Protection Clause.
95. Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975); Kautenburger v.
Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958).
96. Krasnoff v. Hardy, 436 F. Supp. 304 (E.D. La. 1977); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057
(D. Mass. 1976); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.) (en banc), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927
(1978).
97. Bohus v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff must prove
first position is an advantage and that the state intentionally discriminates in its placement); Groes-
beck v. Board of State Canvassers, 251 Mich. 286, 232 N.W. 387 (1930) (practice of placing certain
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Cases which apply a strict standard of review to position bias also
establish a close link between the ballot position, voters' rights, and can-
didates' rights. In Gould v. Grubb,98 the court tied position bias together
with burdens on fundamental rights. The court first accepted the lower
court's evidentiary findings which concluded that position bias is a factor
in elections.99 This factor favors candidates who are listed first for the
office which they seek. Thus, a statutory requirement which places a
certain candidate first on the ballot "discriminates against voters sup-
porting all other candidates, and accordingly can only be sustained if
necessary to further a compelling governmental interest."' ° A statute
such as the one reviewed in Gould discriminates against the fundamental
right of voters to vote. The bias distributes a larger number of any unin-
formed votes to the first listed candidate.'
The court in Gould rejected the governmental interest asserted in
support of the statute. The court found that the interest asserted was not
the compelling interest required to pass the test of strict scrutiny. The
city had contended that since most voting decisions consist of either vot-
ing for or against the incumbent, merely placing the incumbent on the
top of the ballot helped the voters by making their choice "efficient" and
"unconfused."' 2 Not only was the interest not "compelling," but there
were also less restrictive means available to the state to assist voters in
identifying incumbents.10 3 By not choosing to use any of these methods,
the city had consciously favored the incumbent over all other can-
didates.10 4
candidates first is permissible as long as the practice does not prevent the voter from freely expres-
sing himself or herself).
98. 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (Cal. 1975).
99. Id. at 664, 536 P.2d at 1338, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
100. Id. at 664, 536 P.2d at 1338-39, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 378-79.
101. "Indeed, in a close race it is quite possible that a candidate with fewer 'conscious' support-
ers than an opponent will actually win an election simply because his high position on the ballot
affords him the advantage of receiving the vote of unconcerned or uninformed voters." Id. at 670,
536 P.2d at 1343, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 383. See also Schell v. Studebaker, 174 N.E.2d 637 (Ohio C.P.
1960), appeal dismissed, 173 N.E.2d 107 (1961). In Schell the court commented on a rotational
scheme: "People being what they are, there is 'something in a name,' and the people, believing that a
psychological advantage accrues to a name by its position on a ballot, provided that this believed
advantage should be shared among the candidates .... Id. at 639 (quoting Bees v. Gilronon, 116
N.E.2d 317, 319-20 (Ohio C.P.), appeal dismissed, 159 Ohio St. 186, 111 N.E.2d 395 (1953)).
102. Gould, 14 Cal.3d at 672, 536 P.2d at 1344, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
103. "Less restrictive means" in this context refers to alternate methods which do not have such
a great effect on the voters' right to associate with a particular candidate. The right to asociate is
expressed by voting.
104. Id. at 673, 536 P.2d at 1345, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 385. For other cases striking down incum-
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Kautenburger v. Jackson 105 is similar to Gould in that Kautenburger
found that fundamental rights were infringed when a rotated ballot was
not used. However, unlike Gould, this court found that the candidate's
right to not be discriminated against is paramount. Thus, the right to
candidacy is a consideration in position bias cases. The court decided
that ballot rotation is required because the right to be a candidate is fun-
damental,1"6 and it is a commonly known and accepted fact that "where
a number of candidates or nominees for the same office are before the
electorate, those whose names appear at the head of the list have a dis-
tinct advantage."" °7 Consequently, placing one candidate on top of the
ballot unfairly discriminates against other candidates and impairs their
right to candidacy.
B. Minimum Rationality
At the other end of the equal protection spectrum from Gould and
Kautenburger is Ulland v. Growe.108 The court in Ulland applied a mini-
mum rationality test to a Minnesota statute which placed partisan over
nonpartisan candidates. Although agreeing in theory that strict scrutiny
applies when fundamental rights are abridged,109 the court determined
that the effect of the statute on voting rights was only marginal;' 1 and
therefore, a minimum rationality standard was applicable."'
The Ulland court distinguished Gould on two grounds." 2 First, the
holding in Gould was based on a nonpartisan election, while the statute
bent first statutes, see Netsch v. Lewis, 344 F. Supp. 1280 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Holtzman v. Power, 62
Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 311 N.Y.S.2d 824 (1970).
Some support for heightened scrutiny of incumbent first statutes is found in Buckley v. Valeo,
519 F.2d 821 (D.C. 1975), modified, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In discussing the appropriate level of review
of a statute regulating campaign expenditures and contributions, the court stated:
The need for exacting judicial scrutiny is underscored by the plaintiffs' contention that
the legislation is a composite of measures that serve the interests of the "ins" - members
of Congress already elected - in resisting the incursions of the "outs."... In any event, we
are aware that serious constitutional questions are raised by measures that may inhibit poten-
tial candidates.
Id. at 843 (emphasis added). Obviously, legislators who are in office are the ones benefitted by
incumbent first statutes.
105. 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958).
106. Contra, Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412,
415 n.7 (Minn.) (en bane), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
107. Kautenburger, 85 Ariz. at -, 333 P.2d at 295 (quoting Elliot v. Secretary of State, 295
Mich. 245, -, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (1940)).
108. 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.) (en bane), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
109. Id. at 415.
110. Id. at 418.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 416.
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challenged in Ulland applied only to partisan elections.113 Second, the
court in Ulland disagreed with Gould's analogy between position bias
and vote dilution." 4 Vote dilution, in the sense of an unconstitutional
infringement of equal protection, implies the creation of "phantom"
votes."' Position bias, on the other hand, "does not create the same kind
of immutable or absolute advantage or preclusion."1 1 6 The Ulland court
implicitly held that it is possible for every voter to have a true preference
in a race.
Clough v. Guzzi 117 also applied a minimum rationality test to a stat-
ute which required that the incumbent be listed first on the voting ballot.
Clough was distinguished from Gould on the same grounds as in Ulland,
but the court made several other observations that warrant comment.
First, Clough held that there is no constitutional right to have a rational
election. 1 Thus, a ballot may constitutionally inject an irrational influ-
ence on vote choice. Position bias may be one such irrational influence.
Presumably, position bias is permissible because the court in Clough did
not find that any rights of candidates or voters were abridged.11 9 The
absence of those rights puts no limit on how significant of a role position
bias can play in an election. Since statutes governing elections do not
have to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest, position bias is
not an issue.
Secondly, and not surprisingly, the court's analysis in Clough of the
state interest involved was similar to Ulland's and opposed to Gould's.
In Clough, the court found that listing the incumbent first is a legitimate
state interest because incumbency is a primary consideration in vote
choice;120 therefore, the state had a legitimate interest in listing incum-
bents first because it allowed the state to decide who would receive a
majority of any uninformed votes.1 21 Gould, on the other hand, found
113. The court stated that although the expert testimony of each party in Ulland was conflicting,
one point of agreement was that the magnitude of position bias in nonpartisan elections is greater
than in partisan contests. Id at 415.
114. Id. at 416.
115. Id.; see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (Court found that malaportionment
created unequal representation).
116. Ulland, 262 N.W.2d at 416 n.12 (quoting Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D.
Mass. 1976)).
117. 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1976).
118. Id. at 1067. Elections, said the court, could be decided on irrational factors such as "ethnic
affiliation, sex, or home town." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1068.
121. Id.
The Commonwealth also asserts that, if there is an uninformed segment of the voters, those
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that the city has no legitimate right to favor incumbents over other can-
didates, even if incumbency is a primary factor in the vote decision.122
Even though a minimum rationality test gives the greatest amount
of deference to legislative judgments, courts which apply the test have
not always validated all statutes placing the incumbent first on the ballot.
In McLain v. Meier,123 the court applied what could be a stricter form of
minimum rationality. The state of North Dakota had argued that its
statute requiring incumbents to be listed first was justified by its interest
in making voting as easy as possible. 124 However, the court found that
the method that North Dakota had chosen to achieve this goal essen-
tially favored the incumbent who was listed first.121 In doing so, the state
had infringed upon the right to vote of those voters who supported lower
listed candidates. The court in McLain looked beyond whatever interest
was asserted by the state and examined the effect its means would have
on voters. Although a statute placing the incumbent first on the ballot
may be convenient, it also impairs the right to vote; therefore, the court
held that the "incumbent first" statute was unconstitutional.
C. The Two Part Bohus Test
The test developed in the Seventh Circuit for evaluating position
bias cases is distinct from traditional equal protection cases. First intro-
duced in Bohus v. Board of Election Commissioners,'26 the test was later
applied and explained in Sangmeister v. Woodard 127 and Shakman v.
Democratic Organization of Cook County.'28
Bohus involved the validity of an Illinois statute 129 which gave elec-
tion officials discretion in placing candidates' names on ballots. The
plaintiff was a Republican candidate who claimed that he was deprived
of equal protection because the election officials consistently placed Dem-
votes should go to the incumbent candidate who at least has some experience in the busi-
ness of government.
We cannot say that these are illegitimate considerations beyond the authority of the
Commonwealth properly and lawfully to advance.
Id
122. Gould, 14 Cal. 3d at 672-74, 536 P.2d at 1344-45, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
123. 637 F.2d 1159 (8th Cir. 1980). For a complete discussion of this case, see Comment, Elec-
tions - Right of Suffrage and Regulation Thereof- Official Ballots: Validity of Ballot Access and
Ballot Position Restrictions, 57 N.D.L. REV. 495 (1981).
124. McLain, 637 F.2d at 1167.
125. Id.
126, 447 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1971).
127. 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 939 (1978).
128. 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 16-3 (1969).
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ocratic candidates on the ballot first.13 The court ruled that for the
plaintiff to prevail, he would have to show that (1) top placement on the
ballot is an electoral advantage; and (2) he was intentionally denied the
first position. 131 After reviewing the evidence adduced at trial, the Court
of Appeals found that the plaintiff had failed to sustain his burden of
proof on the first element. Since the trial court's finding of an advantage
in being listed first was not clearly erroneous, the appellate court affirmed
the lower court's verdict for the defendant.
132
The court in Sangmeister concentrated its analysis on the second
prong of the Bohus test. 133 The court noted that an earlier Seventh Cir-
cuit case' 34 had found proof of intentional discrimination in extrinsic evi-
dence which indicated that subjective considerations of the Secretary of
State were the determining factors in the assignment of ballot posi-
tions. 135 Similarly, that element of intentional discrimination was also
present in Sangmeister. The court found sufficient evidence of intent by
noting that the practice of placing Democrats first had occurred for a
period of thirty to one hundred years, depending on the county. This
"systematic and widespread" behavior satisfied the constitutional re-
quirement of intent. 136
In reaching this conclusion, the Sangmeister court relied on the legal
precedent of Washington v. Davis. 3  Davis involved a challenge to the
testing in the District of Columbia of all applicants for police officer posi-
tions, alleging that the test was a tool to purposefully discriminate
against all black applicants. 138 The Davis Court held that a facially neu-
tral law is not unconstitutional simply because it affects separate classes
unequally.' 39 Although disproportionate impact is some indication of in-
130. Bohus v. Board of Election Commissioners, 447 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1971). Thus, the
plaintiff never claimed that the statute itself was unconstitutional, but that the manner in which it
was applied was unconstitutional.
131. Id. at 822.
132. Id. at 823. "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous .... " FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a).
133. Sangmeister, 565 F.2d 460.
134. Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969).
135. Id.
The Secretary of State may well have been sincere in his belief that persons with experience
in government and with standing in one of the parties are best qualified to write a constitu-
tion, but the sincerity of his reason for tipping the scales in their favor does not undermine,
but rather supports, the proposition that the discrimination was purposeful and intentional.
Id. at 392.
136. Sangmeister, 565 F.2d at 467.
137. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
138. Id. at 234.
139. Id. at 239.
1987]
21
Dreyer: Constitutional Problems with Statutes Regulating Ballot Position
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
vidious discrimination, the Davis Court stated that other indicators of
purposefulness are required, such as a "systematic exclusion" 140 of one
class of persons from serving on a jury.141 The Court in Davis found that
the systematic exclusion satisfied constitutional standards which require
a purposeful discrimination.
The Sangmeister court relied heavily on systematic exclusion as an
illustration of purposefulness. The court analogized that if a systematic
exclusion of blacks from a jury amounted to intentional discrimination,
then so does systematic exclusion of certain classes of candidates from
the top position of the ballot.' 42  Thus, the purposeful discrimination
prong of the Bohus test was satisfied in Sangmeister."13
One year after deciding Sangmeister, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals heard yet another position bias case. In Board of Election Com-
missioners v. Libertarian Party of Illinois, 44 the court again applied the
Bohus test to uphold the constitutionality of a statutory scheme which
placed new political parties beneath established parties on the ballot.
This time, unlike Sangmeister, the court upheld the placement method.
Sangmeister was distinguished because, in that case, evidence of inten-
tional favoritism toward certain candidates demonstrated an unconstitu-
tional infingement of fundamental rights. A statute which is neutral with
respect to ballot position is a requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause. 145 The court in Libertarian Party found that the statute in ques-
tion satisfied the neutrality requirement.1 46 The method chosen by the
state simply eliminated voter confusion without reducing the chance of
minor parties being elected. 147
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945)).
142. Sangmeister, 565 F.2d at 467.
143. Id. at 467.
144. 591 F.2d 22 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979).
145. Sangmeister, 565 F.2d at 468.
146. Libertarian Party, 591 F.2d at 25.
Different treatment of minority parties that does not exclude them from the ballot, prevent
them from attaining major party status if they achieve widespread support, or prevent any
voter from voting for the candidate of his choice, and that is reasonably determined to be
necessary to further an important state interest does not result in a denial of equal protec-
tion....
In conclusion, we find that the two-tier system of ballot placement by the District
Court is a reasonable solution to the problems faced by the election officials and has not
been shown to be the product of invidious discrimination.
Id. at 25, 27.
The major problem with the court's reasoning is that it assumes that every voter actually has a
preference. Position bias, on the other hand, is apparent only when voters do not have a preference.
Thus, the court's reasoning is particularly ill-suited to application in position bias cases.
147. Id. at 25-26. The court explicitly noted that the purpose of the Illinois scheme was to
[Vol. 23:123
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss1/5
BALLOT POSITION
The decision in Shakman v. Democratic Organization of Cook
County148 sheds light on the first prong of the Bohus test. Shakman at-
tempted to define the meaning of "advantage" under the Bohus test. The
court ruled that a showing of massive electoral advantage in top place-
ment on the ballot is not required. 49 However, the plaintiff in ballot
placement cases is required to show that first place position confers an
actual, "significant" advantage.1 50 This test amounts to something more
than a showing of a de minimus effect and can be satisfied if the plaintiff
shows that top position is "one of a number of factors which tend to
affect the outcome of an election, and which may have a substantial effect
although the degree varies with the circumstances." 15 ' Thus, plaintiff's
burden of proof does not appear to be heavy, given the volume of polit-
ical science studies which have detected position bias.1 2
V. CONCLUSION
Case law reveals that position statutes may be analyzed in three
ways. The majority approach is to apply a minimum rationality test in
which the state interest is usually found to be sufficiently strong to war-
rant upholding the statute. At the other end of the spectrum, some
courts apply a form of strict scrutiny. In these cases, the interests of the
state are given primary consideration. As a result, courts invoking strict
scrutiny usually strike down laws reserving the top position for a particu-
lar type of candidate. Finally, courts in the Seventh Circuit have devel-
oped their own two-part test to apply in ballot position cases. Currently,
little agreement exists among the courts regarding just what rights are
infringed by position statutes and how important those rights are. This
disagreement is evidenced by the three tests which are currently applied
in position cases.
Mark E. Dreyer
prevent voter confusion. Arguably, the result may have been different had there been evidence of
another purpose which was to benefit certain candidates.
148. 481 F. Supp. 1315 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
149. Id. at 1336.
150. Id. at 1337.
151. Id. (quoting Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir. 1969)).
152. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX I
In order to compare the vote total of each candidate while occupy-
ing a different position on the ballot, Bain and Hecock (see note 3) com-
pensate for the difference in vote totals between ballot formats as follows:
Format
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Candidate 3
Ballot Candidate 2 Candidate 3 Candidate 1
Position Candidate 3 Candidate 1 Candidate 2
1 A, B, C,
2 B2  C2  A2
3 C3  A3  B3
Format total T, T11  Til
Total vote = N; m = number of candidates
A, = the number of votes Candidate 1 received while in first posi-
tion, A2 = the number of votes Candidate 1 received while in second
position, etc. T1 = the total number of votes cast on the ballot listing
Candidates 1, 2, and 3, in that order. Bain and Hecock equalize the For-
mat totals in order to see if one candidate received more votes than ex-
pected while occupying a certain position. The formula
C', = CI(N/m)/Tn; Q =
gives the vote each candidate would have gotten if each ballot format had
been used an equal number of times. Using this formula, the first table is
transformed into
Format
Candidate 1 Candidate 2 Candidate 3
Ballot Candidate 2 Candidate 3 Candidate 1
Position Candidate 3 Candidate 1 Candidate 2
1 A, B, C, T,
2 B2 C h2 TA
3 C3 A3 B3 T3
Format total T1 Til Till
Then, absent any position bias, the first position on the ballots should
have received the expected adjusted vote (TI should equal Tl). For ex-
ample, using election returns from a race between two candidates and a
rotated ballot, the raw vote results are:
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1 A,= 12945 B1= 16339 T1=29284
2 B2= 15610 A2= 12216 T2=27826
T =28555 ThI=28555
If there were no position bias, then total vote the first position received,
T', should equal the expected vote total, T'. In this example, the total
vote for the first position exceeds the expected vote total by 2.5%, which
indicates position bias.
See Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An Unconstitutional
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APPENDIX II
Some of Darcy's (see note 9) returns are as follows:
First Position Republican Democrat n = votes cast
President
Republican 48.10% 51.89% 101,712
Democrat 48.29% 51.70% 102,470
U.S. Senate
Republican 49.23% 50.72% 98,813
Democrat 49.67% 50.33% 99.015
U.S. Congress
Republican 35.96% 64.04% 93,437
Democrat 37.31% 62.69% 94,316
District Attorney
Republican 30.26% 69.74% 90,517
Democrat 30.26% 69.74% 90.194
Represent. Dist. 36
Republican 50.41% 49.59% 7,282
Democrat 49.44% 50.56% 7,184
In the race for President, the Republican received 48.10% of the
votes cast on the ballots on which he was listed first. When the positions
were switched, the Democrat received 51.70% of the vote. The Presi-
dential race shows evidence of position bias because the percentage of the
vote each candidate received varied as their position on the ballot
changed.
With the exception of the District Attorney's race, this sampling of
elections show position bias in each race. However, the percentages of
the votes received by each candidate also shows that bias was not the
determinative factor in the elections, with the exception of the District 36
Representative race, which was won by the Democrat. When the Demo-
crat was listed first, he outpolled his challenger; yet when the Democrat
was listed second, the Republican prevailed. The slight variations in the
percentage of the vote each candidate received shows that the race was
very close. Therefore, any position bias, even a statistically insignificant
effect, could change the outcome of the election.
Applying Bain and Hecock's transformation to the District 36 race
bears this out. Their method shows that the first position received
1.0096% of the expected adjusted vote, which is much less than other
races Darcy studied. Nevertheless, because the Democrat won this race
by only twenty votes, any position effect could have determined the out-
come of the election.
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